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The Empirical Link Between Internal Audit, Contract Income  
and ‘Passthrough’ Efficiency in the Top 500 UK Charities 
 
Abstract 
 
This conference paper discusses some of the findings from the author’s PhD thesis which 
considers the ‘marketisation’ of UK charities (Bruce & Chew, 2011) and subsequent 
governance evolution within the sector. It is argued that the considerable flow of public funds 
into the sector has resulted in charities altering their behaviour through having to focus on 
priorities identified by government and operate in ways in which they prescribe. Also, 
extensive performance information is also supplied to government under contractual terms and 
conditions (Hyndman & Jones, 2011). 
 
This study analyses financial statement data taken from a full set of the Charity Commission 
England & Wales database for years 2011 to 2013. The total income analysed represents the 
significant majority of the UK Charity Sector at approximately £50 billion per annum. The 
analysis covers £151 billion in total represented by 27,428 sets of financial results, across three 
reporting years and sixteen charity classifications. Sizes of organisations range significantly 
from one case that declared zero income right up to the largest charity with an income of £950 
million. A regression model was derived from extant literature, and a smaller study conducted 
in New Zealand by Reddy et al. in 2013, in order to analyse the data.  
 
Results of the regression analysis of the full financial data set showed a correlation between 
the level of contract income and operational efficiency, as defined by the traditional 
‘passthrough’ metric, with a 1.5% increase in efficiency observed for a corresponding 10% 
increase in contract income (significant at 1%). This would suggest that charities driven by 
contractual obligations ensure the majority of income is ‘passing through’ to beneficiaries 
rather than cost savings contributing toward surplus funds. It would evidence a focus of 
attention on charitable goals rather than the ‘commercial’ behaviour of creating margins. 
 
A sub-set of the charities was further scrutinised as to the presence of an audit committee, 
internal audit service, board gender diversity and board size. A 20% sample of the ‘Top 500’ 
charities (by income) was used. The charities in the sample ranged in annual income from 
£17million to £781million with an average (mean) income of £55 million. Results from the 
‘Top 500’ data set analysis echoed those of the full data set with a slightly stronger correlation 
between contract income and operational ‘passthrough’ efficiency: a 2.6% increase in 
operational efficiency was derived from a 10% increase in contract income (significant at 1%).  
 
A strong correlation was found between internal audit and operational ‘passthrough’ efficiency 
in the ‘Top 500’ charities. A 14% improvement in ‘passthrough’ efficiency was associated with 
the presence of an internal audit function (significant at 5%).  
 
In conclusion, the argument that a considerable flow of public funds into the sector has resulted 
in charities altering their behaviour may be evidenced by the correlation between contract 
income and ‘passthrough’ efficiencies. Having to focus on priorities identified by the contract, 
and provide considerable amounts of performance data under contractual terms and conditions, 
appears to be increasing the focus on beneficiary outcomes. Results suggest that internal audit 
may play a significant role in assisting trustee boards to achieve this focus. 
 
Keywords: internal audit, contract income, audit committee, governance, charities  
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The Empirical Link Between Internal Audit, Contract Income  
and ‘Passthrough’ Efficiency in the Top 500 UK Charities 
 
Introduction 
 
This conference paper discusses some of the findings from the author’s PhD thesis which 
considers the ‘marketisation’ of UK charities (Bruce & Chew, 2011) and subsequent 
governance evolution within the sector. It is argued that the considerable flow of public funds 
into the sector has resulted in charities altering their behaviour through having to focus on 
priorities identified by government, operate in ways prescribed by government and provide 
considerable amounts of performance data to them under contractual terms and conditions 
(Hyndman & Jones, 2011). With some of the larger charities receiving as much as 90% of their 
income from government, arguments are made that they have become ‘extensions of the state’ 
(Sergeant, 2016). Increasingly complex structures are being adopted by non-profit 
organisations in order to navigate the influences of regulatory issues and governmental policy 
that have generated both ‘quasi-markets’ and ‘quasi-autonomous organisations’ (Cornforth 
2010). Governance systems of many third sector organisations are now ‘multi-level and multi-
faceted’. Trustee boards, mostly comprising unpaid, lay persons are struggling to provide the 
necessary challenge and oversight of executive management in these large and complex 
organisations. The sector has become the focus of public scrutiny following on from financial 
failures in the UK and ‘public trust in charities is at its lowest for eight years’ (Civil Society, 
2015).   
This study analyses financial statement data taken from a full set of the Charity Commission 
England & Wales database for years 2011 to 2013. The total income analysed represents the 
significant majority of the UK charity sector at approximately £50 billion per annum. The 
analysis covers £151 billion in total represented by 27,428 sets of financial results, across three 
reporting years and sixteen sectors. Sizes of organisations range significantly from one case 
that declared zero income right up to the largest charity with an income of £950 million. These 
combined to produce a mean £5.5m income per annum. A regression model was derived from 
extant literature, and a smaller study conducted in New Zealand by Reddy et al. in 2013, in 
order to analyse the data. A sub-set of the charities was further scrutinised as to the presence 
of an audit committee, internal audit service, board gender diversity and board size. This 
information was taken from the Annual Reports of charities to supplement the financial data in 
the regression model. A 20% sample of the ‘Top 500’ Charites (by income) was used. The 
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charities in the sample ranged in annual income from £17million to £781million with an 
average (mean) income of £55 million. 
 
Background and Hypotheses 
 
Charities are non-profit organisations that exist to provide a public benefit. They traditionally 
facilitated the flow of resources, including time and money, from donors to beneficiaries 
(Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). However, the precise, legal definition of a charity varies 
across national jurisdictions (Hyndman & Jones, 2011). The UK charity sector has grown 
significantly in recent years with the number of UK charities increasing from 169,000 in 2006 
(NCVO) to 188,000 by 2015 (Charity Commission, 2015; OCSR, 2015). Governmental 
influence over the last thirty years has been to try and introduce private sector, ‘market-like’ 
mechanisms to bring about a reform of public service provision. This was brought about by a 
decentralisation of service delivery and promotion of competition. The changing profile of the 
charity sector and the creation of new charities after the contracting out of public services has 
been categorised by Bruce & Chew as a ‘marketisation’ effect (2011). The marketisation trend 
in the UK echoes that of other developed western economies, such as the US, where market-
based principles have been applied to reform public services (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004).  
 
Figure A: Income trend over 12 years from 2001 to 2013 
 
UK Civil Society Almanac, NCVO 2015 
 
Whereas previously statutory funding was delivered by way of grants, now the move is toward 
the use of contracts. In 2009, NCVO identified that 70% of all statutory funding was delivered 
via fulfilment of a contract. Earlier work by Bruce (2005) considered whether charities can 
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adapt to the new, market based environment without compromising their core values. The 
increase in trading activities in the charity sector is evidenced by the increase in ‘earned 
income’. As a percentage of the total income of UK charities, earned income represented 50% 
in 2000 and had risen to 70% by 2007 (Bruce & Chew, 2011). This is further demonstrated 
below showing figures up to and including 2013 (see figure A).  
Tougher regulations and enforcement are called for by Eisenberg (2008) who states that 
although non-profits are ’…fighting hard against more regulation and scrutiny…’ that there is 
no substitute for this. He goes further to say that self-regulation is not acceptable ‘…self-
reform, however attractive to a self-indulgent charity community, is not an adequate 
substitute…’. Bruce & Chew (2011) agree that charities may need to adopt private sector 
governance and management systems to remain economically viable, and this may also affect 
their overall aims and objectives leading to ‘mission drift’. The ‘marketisation’ (Bruce & 
Chew, 2011) of the charity sector following the Big Society 2010 government initiative is 
discussed by Hyndman & Jones, 2011. They argue that the considerable flow of public funds 
into the sector has resulted in charities altering their behaviour by: having to focus on priorities 
identified by government; operate in ways prescribed by government; and to provide 
considerable amounts of performance data to government under contractual terms and 
conditions. In a report produced by the House of Commons Public Administration Select 
Committee in December 2011, The Big Society: HC 902-1, concerns were raised (items 43-48, 
pages 18-19) regarding the effect of the initiative on the voluntary sector. These concerns were 
centred on issues of ‘marketisation’ and the increasing commercial behaviours of non-profits 
in the delivery of public services. The concerns were around: polarisation; independence; 
‘mission drift’ (Bruce & Chew, 2011); isomorphism; the distorting effect of new entrants 
chasing public contracts; and the danger of charities becoming agents of public policy. 
Polarisation 
Concerns were raised about the likelihood of a polarisation of charitable entities 
according to their size and level of contracted public service contracts, with these 
factors causing a commercialisation of larger charities: a polarisation within the sector 
with “a larger gulf between large, ‘professionalised’ or ‘corporate’ charitable 
companies, and small, local, entirely voluntary community groups” (House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2011, 18). This is something that 
is further investigated through the financial analysis of the Charity Commission data 
set, with tests aimed at showing correlations between size, levels of contract income 
and ‘commercial’ behaviours of charities. However, a straight forward graphical 
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representation is available from the NCVO publication the UK Civil Society Almanac 
2015 shown below: 
Figure B: Income analysis by size of organisation 2012/ 2013 
 
UK Civil Society Almanac, NCVO 2015 
We can see that government income levels are significantly greater in the larger 
charities, with levels double or more those of smaller charities small charities.  
Independence 
Reassurance was sought that the independence of the charity sector would not be 
compromised. It is interesting to reflect back here on the definition of charities as used 
by the Office of National Statistics; this requires the charity to have independent 
governance which is separate from government. Harris expressed doubts about the level 
of independence from government exercised by charities which were heavily dependent 
on public contract income back in 2001. An article in The Times newspaper (Bennett, 
2015) claimed that Big charities are ‘secretly hooked on state funding’. This article 
draws on details from a report issued by the ‘right-wing think tank’ Centre for Policy 
Studies which claims that the ‘proportion of funds that charities receive from the state 
is thought to have accelerated in the last decade’ (Bennett, 2015). The question as to 
whether charities should be independent from government is a thought-provoking one. 
As part of a societal lifeworld (Habermas, 1987) the charitable ‘sub-systems’ are 
subject to the steering media, brought about by that society, in order for it to function. 
These include legislation and regulation presented by government. Under such 
circumstances charities, as sub-systems of the whole, are never going to be wholly 
independent from government. However, donors making payments into charitable 
organisations may not wish to see their money diverted toward the achievement of 
politicised aims held by individual governments. The objects of a charity provide a 
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degree of protection here for donors, by preserving the focus of delivery of key 
objectives, but it is still and interesting area for discussion. Maintaining the integrity of 
charities by preserving focus against its objects brings us to the next concern of the 
committee: mission drift. 
Mission-drift 
The changes in government funding of charities, which has moved from grants to 
contracts, has been accompanied by greater performance monitoring and inspection 
(Cornforth, 2003). Bruce (2005) considered whether charities can adapt to the new, 
market based environment without compromising their core values: ‘mission drift’. 
Later work by Bruce, in collaboration with Chew, (2011) also suggested that charities 
may need to adopt private sector governance and management systems to remain 
economically viable, and this may also affect their overall aims and objectives leading 
to ‘mission drift’. This is reflected in the concerns raised through the committee: 
“charities that deliver public services are significantly less likely to agree that their 
charitable activities are determined by their mission rather than by funding 
opportunities.” (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2011, 
18). Hyndman & Jones (2011) state that a ‘serious consideration of beneficiaries and 
their views’ constitutes a ‘vital’ element of good governance in charities and that 
involvement of beneficiaries in decision making can help guard against mission drift.  
Isomorphism 
In earlier decades the discussion of isomorphism was based around normative 
behaviours driven by the ‘signalling’ of charities (Maggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1991) to suggest legitimacy to potential donors. Concerns are that as the sector 
changes to a ‘marketised’ version, isomorphic behaviours become mimetic rather than 
normative, as charities imitate commercial behaviours with the aim of improving cost 
efficiencies, rather than attempting to signal social fitness through the traditional means 
of lower salaries and suitable ‘ethical’ behaviours. As the signalling of legitimacy 
through traditional, charitable behaviours is overtaken by commercial style indicators 
of success the worry is that the traditional ethos of the sector will be overridden. When 
measuring success it is important to relate positive outcomes to objectives that may well 
be non-financial in principle. This study will consider the application of traditional 
charity performance metrics (passthrough ratio) against commercial style metrics that 
focus on generating margins through cost efficiencies with a view to considering this 
issue further. 
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New entrants purely in response to marketisation 
New entrants in 2011 were observed to be more active in delivering public service 
contracts than the rest of the sector at that point: ‘Over half of all new charities 
registered with the Charity Commission between April and September 2011 have 
contracts to deliver public services, in comparison with only 39% of all charities as a 
whole.’ (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2011, 18). 
Levels of contract income will be analysed as part of the financial data analysis and this 
may be shown as a transition over the three years from 2011 to 2013. 
Charities become agents of public policy 
This concern further echoes the one raised over independence. As governmental 
influences increase charities may be used to deliver public policy. In light of the 
growing governmental influence in the charity sector, and the devolution of powers to 
organise and deliver public services, we also need to consider the influence of ‘political 
governance’ on charitable bodies (Rhodes, 1994; Cornforth, 2010).  This is also 
reflected in the Habermasian view of society (1987), its sub-systems and steering 
media: where the charitable organisations are subsystems and steering media include 
regulators and governmental bodies.  
Governance challenges 
The changes in government funding of charities, moving from grants to contracts, has been 
accompanied by greater performance monitoring and inspection (Cornforth, 2003). There has 
also been a desire by non-profit organisations to develop new sources of income, some through 
commercial activities, and this large growth in earned income has implications for governance 
(Wilding et al., 2006; Reichart et al., 2008). The governance challenges faced by charities, and 
the strategies they adopt to cope with such challenges, may be influenced by a number of 
factors. The stage of an organisation’s development or lifecycle (Wood, 1992) and whether the 
organisation is facing extreme challenges may determine their approach to governance 
(Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004). International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) have 
developed inter-organisational governance arrangements to help co-ordinate activities on an 
international level and deal with differing legal and regulatory requirements and resource 
dependencies, such as the UK reliance on government contracts and partnerships (Cornforth, 
2010). This echoes the ‘internal colonisation’ of steering media identified by Habermasian 
theory (Habermas, 1987: Broadbent & Laughlin, 2005), as discussed earlier in this section. 
Governance strategies for large, modern charities may involve the establishment of complex 
governance structures beyond the main board, the creation of subsidiary boards and 
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consultative structures, such as beneficiary scrutiny panels. Bruce & Chew (2011) state that 
‘core values’ should remain the cornerstones of governance approaches in charities: altruism; 
compassion; charity; philanthropy; volunteerism; co-operation and collaboration. The call for 
improved governance practices is echoed in the study by Vernon & Stringer in 2009, A Review 
of Charity Trusteeship in the UK. It states that ‘…many of the things that might improve the 
quality of governance formalise it in a way that some trustees will find unpalatable…’. They 
go on to say that the power of stakeholders is insufficient to exact greater accountability 
‘…beneficiaries, funders and regulators all have some part in this, but none of these groups 
currently exert enough pressure on boards to improve…’ (p1). In his 2010 review of future 
directions for third sector governance research, Cornforth calls for an examination of ‘…how 
board structures and processes change over time and how these are influenced by internal and 
external contextual factors’.  
 
Public Benefit Test 
The Charities Act 2006 made it compulsory for all charities in England and Wales to pass a 
‘public benefit test’. This involves supplying evidence that: the beneficiaries are appropriate to 
the aims; the opportunity to benefit must not be unreasonably restricted; people in poverty must 
not be excluded from the opportunity to benefit; and any private benefits must be incidental.  
There are growing expectations within the public for greater transparency and accountability 
within charities. The Charity Commission list reputational risk as a ‘major’ risk element to be 
mitigated (Charity Commission, 2007).  A ‘public benefit’ reporting requirement is a 
compulsory part of the Trustees’ Annual Report and necessitated through accounting standards. 
In their study form 2013, Morgan & Fletcher observed that this requirement gave charities a 
wider accountability ‘…not just to their trustees, donors, or immediate service users…’ but to 
the ‘wider public’.  This message of wider accountability is endorsed by the chief executive of 
the Charity Commission who concludes that this is entirely right because ‘…the entire sector 
benefits from indirect public support through the legal and fiscal privileges charity status 
confers’ (Sam Younger, Grant Thornton Charity Review, 2013, 4). 
Evolution of Charity Governance Structures 
Increasingly complex structures are being adopted by non-profit organisations in order to 
navigate the influences of regulatory issues and governmental policy. There are two key 
elements that have resulted from governmental reforms over the last 30 years identified by 
Cornforth (2010); quasi-markets and quasi-autonomous organisations. The drive to bring 
competitive forces into public services has resulted in the creation of  ‘quasi-markets’ and the 
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separation of the roles of ‘purchasers’ (customers) and ‘providers’ (sellers) of public services; 
the effects of this ‘marketisation’. 
Cornforth & Simpson (2002) identified that governance structures, board size, formalisation 
and associated problems all varied according to organisational size. Later work by Cornforth 
in 2010 suggests that the governance systems of many third sector organisations are ‘multi-
level and multi-faceted’. 
Quasi- autonomous organisations  
These are organisations created to operate semi-autonomously from government, but 
still be accountable to them. Powers are devolved to allow these organisations to deliver 
public services and examples include leisure and hospital trusts and housing 
associations (Mullins 2006). These changes have led to a ‘blurring of the lines’ between 
the public, private and third sectors.  Cornforth (2003) comments on the evolution of 
third sector organisations to create ‘hybrids’ such as social enterprises, which pursue 
both social and commercial objectives. Governmental influence has been toward the 
construction of social enterprises since the early 2000s (DTI, 2002; Cabinet Office, 
2006).They have multiple goals which include social, economic, resource and 
governance based aims (Chew, 2009).  
Commercial groups with charitable subsidiaries 
A number of social enterprises, that were specifically established to trade commercially, 
have created charitable subsidiaries to pursue their social aims (Spear et al., 2007). This 
allows them to attract the tax relief and grants only available to charities and also protect 
their socially motivated, charitable activities (Social Enterprise Coalition, 2007). 
Charity group structures with profit making subsidiaries  
A UK charity that wishes to engage in significant trading (that does not directly further 
its charitable objects) has, by law, to establish a separate, trading subsidiary. The 
decision to set up a trading subsidiary may also be made to protect charitable assets 
from trading risks and for tax purposes (Sladden, 2008). This results in a group structure 
where subsidiaries have their own separate boards, but ultimately are accountable to the 
charitable parent. Profits from the trading subsidiary are typically gift-aided to the 
parent entity on an annual basis. 
Charity partnerships with commercial and governmental bodies 
In a bid to address social issues there has been a move on behalf of government to create 
inter-organisational partnerships to deliver local and national initiatives (Newman, 
2001). These have taken several structures ranging from informal networks to formally 
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agreed structures, terms and conditions. Renz (2006) suggests that this type of approach 
may no longer be sufficient and many social issues need to be addressed at a higher 
level.  
Collaborative Agreements and Mergers 
The decision by the former Housing Corporation (HC) to allocate housing development 
grants only to the larger, well established housing associations as ‘development 
partners’ led to an increase in collaborative agreements and mergers in the sector 
(Mullins & Pawson, 2010). This decision taken by the HC, as a public funder of 
subsidised, social housing, directly affected the profile of organisations in the sector, in 
terms of size, governance structure and organisational complexity.   
Membership Associations 
This structure typically consists of a set of members that elect or select a board, which 
is then accountable to members through annual meetings. This generates a two-tier, 
governance structure (Cornforth, 2010). In 2004 the Charity Commission identified that 
approximately half of the charities on its register had voting members, representing 
around 80,000 organisations. Another 20,000 charities, a further 12.5% of the total, had 
non-voting members. There are distinctive governance challenges when dealing with 
membership associations and the Charity Commission identified that they generate a 
greater scope for governace disputes (2004). These may arise form member relations 
not being manged well, membership records not being kept up to date and a non-diverse 
membership that is susceptible to domination by particular interest groups (Cornforth, 
2010). 
Federations, Confederations, Networks and Support Organisations 
In a study from 2007 Brown et al. examined the governance structures of international 
advocacy charities. Examples of these types of organisations include, Amnesty 
International, Unicef and Save The Children and they are referred to as International 
Advocacy Non-Governmental Organisations (IANGOs).  Four types of structure were 
identified: federations; confederations; networks; and support organisations. 
Federations have relatively centralised decision making processes and examples 
include Amnesty International and Greenpeace. Within confederations, national sub-
sections have greater autonomy than the federations and they tend to concentrate on 
their work at a local level, for example, Oxfam International. Networks are largely 
autonomous organisations that share common values and information, for example, 
12 
 
CIVICUS. Support Organisations provide advice and support to a larger movement of 
networks, such as the Association for Women’s Rights in Development. 
Federal and Confederal Structures 
These consist of independent local charities that are supported by a national charity 
providing a range of services. The democratic member involvement at local, regional 
and national levels, creates multiple layers of governance (Cornforth, 2010). These 
multi-level governance structures are found in national organisations, such as Mind, 
Citizens Advice and Age UK. 
Charity SORP 
The charity SORP, or Statement of Recommended Practice, provides guidance on how charity 
financial statements should be compiled for those accounts presented on an accruals basis. The 
Charity Commission and the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) are authorised 
by the Financial Reporting Council to produce the charity SORP, in accordance with the body’s 
reporting standards, after consultation and review with charities. 
Differentiation is made between ‘smaller entities’ and larger charities in terms of the SORP 
requirements. To qualify as a smaller entity the charity must meet two out of three of the 
following criteria: 
 gross income not exceeding £6.5 million; 
 total assets not exceeding £3.26 million; and/or 
 employs no more than 50 staff. 
If differentiation is desirable for financial compliance, then maybe it follows that a similar 
distinction is suitable for governance.  
Research Design 
This analysis follows a similar approach to work undertaken by Reddy Locke and Fauzi (2013) 
based on registered charities in New Zealand ‘Relevance of corporate governance practices in 
charitable organisations: A case study of registered charities in New Zealand’.  
Financial Performance Metrics 
Metrics for allocative and technical efficiency are used as a proxy for ‘performance’ and 
considered through the statistical analysis of published of data, obtained from the Charity 
Commission in 2014, representing financial years ending 2011, 2012 and 2013: 
 Traditional charity metric: Allocative efficiency (aEFF) 
Donors typically want to see a high ‘passthrough’ ratio, which represents the proportion 
of a charity’s income that is ultimately distributed to beneficiaries, and this is a standard 
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indicator within the charity sector of how organisations are performing (Hyndman & 
Jones, 2011). 
aEFF = Total costs of charitable activity provision/ Total revenue from 
charitable activity income and donations 
(reflecting the utilisation of charity funds for beneficiary services) 
A higher allocative efficiency represents a higher level of performance. 
 Commercial style metric: Technical efficiency (tEFF) 
The use of this particular metric in the Reddy et al. study is interesting as it represents 
more of a commercial approach to performance. The idea, of not expending all 
incoming resources, supports the concept of generating an accounting surplus or profit 
and is so inherently capitalistic in its nature. 
tEFF= Total operating expenses/ Total revenue 
A lower value of technical efficiency represents a higher level of performance. 
 
As this study considers the ‘marketisation’ of the UK charity sector as a factor in the financial 
analysis it is really useful to have the two metrics representing slightly different approaches: 
the typical charitable focus in allocative efficiency; and more of a commercial focus in 
technical efficiency.  
Data Set Analysed 
Statistical analyses of sector data obtained from the Charity Commission England and Wales 
and representing financial years ending 2011 to 2013. The data set is particularly large and 
diverse. It represents 27,428 sets of financial results, across three reporting years and sixteen 
sectors. Sizes of organisations range significantly: from one case that declared zero income 
right up to the largest charity with an income of £950 million. 
OLS regression of financial data set 
An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model is used to analyse relationships between 
performance, in the form of the dependent variables aEFF and tEFF, as defined above. The 
quantitative analysis within this study relies on figures taken from financial statements. 
 
Hypotheses (H) 
H1. Contract income is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of 
charities. 
Governmental influence over the last thirty years has been to try and introduce private 
sector, ‘market-like’ mechanisms to bring about greater efficiencies in public service 
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provision. This was introduced by a decentralisation of service delivery and promotion 
of competition, and in some part, by the Big Society 2010 initiative. The changing 
profile of the charity sector and the creation of new charities after the contracting out 
of public services has been categorised by Bruce & Chew as a ‘marketisation’ effect 
(2011). The marketisation trend in the UK echoes that of other developed western 
economies, such as the US, where market-based principles have been applied to reform 
public services (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). The proposition is that ‘marketisation’ 
leads to greater operational efficiency. Therefore the first hypothesis is that contract 
income is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of charities. 
H2. Debt is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of charities.  
There is an argument that organisations holding debt are monitored and evaluated by 
the debtholders, and so this provides an additional governance mechanism, through this 
set of key stakeholders (Reddy et al., 2013; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Begley & 
Feltham, 1999; Jensen, 1986). The proposition is that the additional governance 
associated with debt leads to greater operational efficiency. Therefore the second 
hypothesis is that debt is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of 
charities. 
H3. Volunteerism is positively correlated with allocative efficiency in charities. 
Cordery et al. (2011) argue that the presence of volunteers can provide an important 
bond between charities and their communities, so strengthening stakeholder 
accountability. However, Hyndman & Jones (2011) warn that the major benefits 
volunteers bring to charities, such as focus, passion and legitimation, may not be 
adequately reflected in standard performance metrics. It is proposed that volunteers 
regularly monitor the actions of decision makers, against outcomes of the charitable 
organisation, to ensure their effort is utilised in an efficient manner and specifically to 
deliver charitable services (Reddy et al., 2013). Therefore the third hypothesis is that 
volunteerism is positively correlated with the allocative efficiency of charities. 
H4. Governance processes are positively correlated with the operational efficiency of 
charities. 
In their study from 2009 (1), A Review of Charity Trusteeship in the UK , Vernon & 
Stringer state that ‘…in practice, many large charities are run exclusively by their 
management…’. The study calls for funders to exert greater pressure on charities to 
evidence ‘good governance’ practices through bringing it in to selection processes for 
grants. Messner (2009) also echoes the need for charities to guard against management 
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acting in their own self-interest.  The changes in government funding of charities, which 
has moved from grants to contracts, has been accompanied by greater performance 
monitoring and inspection (Cornforth, 2003). Earlier work by Bruce (2005) considered 
whether charities can adapt to the new, market based environment without 
compromising their core values. Later work by Bruce in collaboration with Chew 
(2011) also suggested that charities may need to adopt private sector governance and 
management systems to remain economically viable. The proposition is that 
governance processes lead to greater operational efficiency. Therefore the fourth 
hypothesis is that governance expenditure is positively correlated with the operational 
efficiency of charities. 
H5. Competition within the charity sector is positively correlated with operational 
efficiency. 
The promotion of competition by the Big Society 2010 initiative and the subsequent 
changing profile of the charity sector, after the contracting out of public services, has 
been categorised by Bruce & Chew as a ‘marketisation’ effect (2011). The 
marketisation trend in the UK echoes that of other developed western economies, such 
as the US, where market-based principles have been applied to reform public services 
(Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). The proposition is that increased competition through 
‘marketisation’ leads to greater operational efficiency. Therefore the fifth hypothesis is 
that competition is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of charities. The 
proxy used for competition is the level of costs associated with raising donations, such 
as advertising expenditure, which should rise as charities compete for donor income. 
Control for Size 
The data set represents financial information from around 8,000 charities over the three 
years from 2011-13. The total number of charity-years is 27,428. Within this set the 
size of organisations varies considerably. To control for size within the model two 
measures are introduced: Total Assets (TA); and Total Income (TINC).  
Control for Sector 
Different charity sectors may have been influenced to a lesser or greater extent by 
marketisation. Inclusion of the control for sector allows for this influence to be tested 
and also to test the effect this has upon performance. 
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Model specification 
Ordinary least squares regression is used to analyse panel data for the years 2011-2013 and 
measure the effect of the independent variables on charity performance.  
The following panel data model was estimated prior to the findings: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 =  𝛼  +    𝛽1  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 +   𝛽2  𝐿𝐸𝑉 +   𝛽3  𝑉𝑂𝐿  +   𝛽4 𝐺𝑂𝑉 
+   𝛽5  𝐴𝐷𝑉  +    𝛽6  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸  +    ∑ 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖   +    𝑒
𝑇
𝑖=1
 
 
          
 
    
 
PERF is the charities efficiency measured by tEFF and aEFF; SIZE = Ln(TA) or LN(TINC); T = 16; I = range 1 to 16, and the independent 
variables are defined as: CONT = Proportion of income derived from charitable contracts; LEV  = Proportion of debt to total assets; VOL  = 
Proportion of total workforce comprised from volunteers; GOV  = Proportion of total expenditure assigned to governance; ADV  = Proportion 
of expenditure to facilitate voluntary income; SIZE  = Ln(TA) Reflection of size using total assets (natural log); or   = Ln(TINC) Reflection 
of size using total income (natural log); SECT = Charity commission classifications ranging from 101 to 116 
                
 
Dependent variables (DV) 
There are two dependent variables included in this data analysis as proxies for performance 
(PERF):  
 
DndV1. Allocative efficiency [aEFF] 
Reflecting the utilisation of charity funds for beneficiary services 
=  Total costs of charitable activity provision 
                          Total revenue 
A higher percentage indicates a greater allocative efficiency. 
 
In terms of the regression model it would be expected that where we see a positive 
correlation between [aEFF] and the independent variables this would indicate a positive 
correlation with performance. Donors typically want to see a high ‘passthrough’ ratio, 
which represents the proportion of a charity’s income that is ultimately distributed to 
beneficiaries, and this is a standard indicator within the charity sector of how 
organisations are performing (Hyndman & Jones, 2011). 
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DndV2. Technical efficiency  
Percentage of operating expenses compared to total revenue  
= Total operating expenses 
           Total revenue 
A lower percentage indicates a greater technical efficiency. 
 
In terms of the regression model it would be expected that where we see a positive 
correlation between [tEFF] and the independent variables this would indicate a negative 
correlation with performance. The use of this particular metric in the Reddy et al. study 
is interesting as it represents more of a commercial approach to performance. The idea, 
of not expending all incoming resources, supports the concept of generating an 
accounting surplus or profit and is so inherently capitalistic in its nature. 
 
Independent variables (IndV) 
IndV1. Contract Income (CONT) 
Proportion of income derived from charitable contracts defined as: 
= Charitable contract income 
Total income 
 
Rationale for inclusion in the model 
The marketisation trend in the UK echoes that of other developed western economies, 
such as the US, where market-based principles have been applied to reform public 
services (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). Whereas previously statutory funding was 
delivered by way of grants, now the move is toward the use of contracts. In 2009, 
NCVO identified that 70% of all government funding in this area was delivered via 
fulfilment of a contract. The proportion of income derived through contractual 
obligations is an indicator of the level of marketisation (Bruce & Chew, 2011) 
experienced by charitable organisations. The changes in government funding of 
charities, which has moved from grants to contracts, has been accompanied by greater 
performance monitoring (Cornforth, 2003). The introduction of market-like 
mechanisms was ultimately to improve performance. 
Inclusion of this variable tests for correlation between increased marketisation and 
improved performance. 
 
18 
 
IndV2. Leverage (LEV) 
Proportion of debt defined as: 
= Long term debt 
Total net assets 
Rationale for inclusion in the model 
There is an argument that organisations holding debt are monitored and evaluated by 
the debtholders, and so this provides an additional governance mechanism, through this 
set of key stakeholders (Reddy et al., 2013; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Begley & 
Feltham, 1999; Jensen, 1986). The proposition is that the additional governance 
associated with debt leads to greater operational efficiency.  
Inclusion of this variable tests for improvements in performance generated through the 
additional oversight of debtholders as key stakeholders. 
IndV3. Volunteerism (VOL) 
Proportion of total workforce comprised from volunteers defined as: 
= Number of volunteers 
Total number of staff and volunteers 
Rationale for inclusion in the model 
Volunteers regularly monitor the actions of decision makers, against outcomes of the 
charitable organisation, to ensure their effort is utilised in an efficient manner and 
specifically to deliver charitable services (Reddy et al., 2013). Larger and well 
established charities are adopting private sector management styles and employing 
greater numbers of paid staff instead of relying on volunteers (Bruce & Chew, 2011). 
Cordery et al. (2011) argue that the presence of volunteers can provide an important 
bond between charities and their communities, so strengthening stakeholder 
accountability. However, Hyndman & Jones (2011) warn that the major benefits 
volunteers bring to charities, such as focus, passion and legitimation, may not be 
adequately reflected in standard performance metrics. Inclusion of this variable tests 
for improvements in performance generated through the additional oversight of 
volunteers as key stakeholders. 
IndV4. Governance Expenditure (GOV) 
Proportion of total expenditure assigned to governance defined as: 
=  Governance expenditure 
Total operational expenditure 
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Rationale for inclusion in the model 
Bruce & Chew (2011) suggest that charities may need to adopt private sector 
governance and management systems to remain economically viable. Inclusion of this 
variable tests for improvements in performance generated through a greater 
organisational focus on governance. 
 
IndV5. Adverstising and non-trading fundraising (ADV) 
Proportion of expenditure used to facilitate voluntary income defined as: 
=Voluntary income costs 
Total operational expenditure 
Rationale for inclusion in the model 
Hind states that the annual income of charities in England and Wales alone was in 
excess of £50 billion in his paper of 2011. This has created an increasingly competitive 
‘market’ for charities in terms of attracting donors, other funding, volunteers and sector 
specific resources. It is speculated whether increased competition, through such 
‘marketisation’, leads to greater operational efficiency. The proxy used for competition 
is the level of costs associated with raising donations, such as advertising expenditure, 
which should rise as charities compete for donor income. 
Inclusion of this variable tests for improvements in performance generated through 
increased competition in the sector. 
 
IndV6a. Control for Size - ASSETS (Ln (TA)) 
Reflection of size using total assets defined as: 
Natural log (Ln) of Total assets 
 
IndV6b. Control for Size - Income (Ln (TINC)) 
Reflection of size using total income defined as: 
Natural log (Ln) of Total income 
 
Rationale for inclusion in the model 
The data set represents financial information from around 8,000 charities over the three 
years from 2011-13. The total number of charity-years is 27,428. Within this set the 
size of organisations varies considerably. To control for size within the model two 
measures are introduced: Total Assets (TA); and Total Income (TINC).  
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IndV - Control for sectorial effect 
Reflection of sector influence using dummy variables (equal to ‘1’ if charity belongs to 
this sector, otherwise ‘0’) as shown in adjacent table: 
Rationale for inclusion in the model 
Different charity sectors may have been influenced to a lesser or greater extent by 
marketisation. Inclusion of the control for sector allows for this influence to be tested 
and also to test the effect this has upon performance. 
 
Data and data sources for financial analysis 
The data for this research study was obtained from the Charity Commission England & Wales 
and represents the financial years ending 2011, 2012 and 2013. It is their complete set of data 
for these three years and includes 27,428 charity-year sets of financial data. 
The financial data is that included in their Financial Statements as regulated by Financial 
Reporting and Accounting Standards and the Charities SORP 2005. On average, around 9,000 
charities are included for each of the three financial years resulting in the 27,428 sets of data. 
The publicly available data from the Register of Charities is subject to the terms of the Open 
Government Licence available online at the National Archive website: 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/2/ 
Table I: Charity Sector Classifications 
[SECT 101] – General purposes 
Examples of charities listed as active in this sector include The Rotary Club, Relate and many 
memorial trusts dedicated to named individuals. 
[SECT 102] – Education 
Charities listed in this sector include The British Safety Council, research scholarships and lecture 
funds, and educational trusts and funds. Many private schools are part of this sector including the 
Westminster School and Cheltenham College. 
[SECT 103] - Health  
Charities included here are Marie Curie Cancer, Leukaemia & Lymphoma Research and the British 
Pregnancy Advisory Service. 
[SECT 104] - Disability 
Example charities from this sector include Scope, and Action for Children and Mencap. 
[SECT 105] – Relief of poverty 
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The Oasis Charitable Trust, the Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) and the Shaw Trust are all active 
in this sector. 
[SECT 106] – Overseas aid 
Examples of charities in this sector include Wateraid, Oxfam and Save the Children. 
[SECT 107] - Housing 
This sector includes the Single Homeless Project, Together, and many Housing Trusts, including 
the Wrekin Housing Trust. 
[SECT 108] – Religious 
Charities included here are the Salvation Army, Methodist Church in Great Britain and the 
Samaritan’s Purse. 
[SECT 109] - Arts 
Includes the Conservatoire for Dance & Drama, Wales Millenium Centre, and the Royal Academy 
of Arts.  
[SECT 110] – Sport 
The London Marathon, Hertsmere Leisure and the Professional Footballers’ Association are all 
participate in this sector. 
[SECT 111] - Animals 
Examples here include the Dogs Trust, RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals) and the WWF (World Wildlife Fund). 
[SECT 112] - Environment 
The Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust is part of both sectors 111 and 112. The Conservation 
Volunteers and Practical Action are also active in sector 112. 
[SECT 113] – Community development 
The Energy Saving Trust, the Anchor Trust and Walsall Housing Group are all participants in the 
Community Development sector. 
[SECT 114] – Armed forces 
This sector includes Help for Heroes, the ‘Lest We Forget’ Association and the Honorable Artillery 
Company. 
[SECT 115] – Human rights 
Examples here include Amnesty International, Anti-Slavery International and the Islamic Unity 
Society. 
[SECT 116] – Recreation 
The Guide Association, Womens Institute and Scout Groups all come under this heading. 
Note: where charities operate in more than one sector each entry is included. 
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Pairwise correlation of the independent and control variables 
The independent and control variables were tested for the likelihood of multicollinearity, which 
if found would undermine the reliability of the model. The highest correlation was found 
between the independent variables relating to size: Ln (TA) and Ln(TINC). These had a 
positive correlation coefficient of 0.549 (significant at 1%) and is entirely to be expected. Those 
charities with a large asset base also will typically generate large amounts of income. This is 
also in keeping with findings of the study by Reddy et al. (2013) where the coefficient of 
correlation between these two variables was found to be 0.528 (also significant at 1%). The 
next highest correlation was a negative one between the level of contract income (CONT) and 
the level of advertising expenditure (ADV). Again, this is to be expected, as charities with high 
levels of contract income will not necessarily be pursuing public donations, through 
advertising, as ardently as peers without a fixed income. Other correlations range between 
0.000 and 0.335. None of the coefficients of correlation between independent variables are 
higher than 0.550 and so the possibility of multicollinearity is low. 
 
Findings and regression results: full financial data set 
Variability within the full financial data set 
Low levels of R2 reflect high variability within the data and makes the model limited in its use as 
a predictive tool for individual charities. This is to be expected due the ranges of organisations 
involved. It does not, however, detract from the underlying relationships and patterns that have 
been established through the model and shown to be of high significance (most at the 1% level).  
The adjusted R2 figure is a variation of R2 that regulates for the number of terms in a model.  R2 
will always increase when a new term is added to a model, but adjusted R2 only increases if the 
new term develops the model more than would be likely by chance. As both versions are virtually 
identical in both models this shows that the addition of extra terms has not just automatically 
increased the R2 by chance. These analytics are purely financial and so it is not unexpected that 
other, qualitative factors may affect efficiencies to a greater extent than those provided through a 
financial analysis.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The charities in the sample covered a range in annual income from £0 to £951 million with an 
average (mean) income of £5.5 million. Volunteers made up 18% (mean) of the total 
workforce. Expenditure on advertising and fundraising was 3.4% (mean) of total operating 
costs and 2.0% (mean) of total operating costs was also spent on governance. The assets of the 
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charities ranged from £0 to £15 billion with an average level of £13 million (mean). Please 
refer to table x for a more complete analysis of the descriptive statistics for the variables.  
The financial data analysed represents a significant sub-section of the total UK charity sector 
and accounts for around £50 billion of income annually. A way to consider the level of 
marketisation in the sector is to identify the level of income generated under ‘commercial’ style 
contractual arrangements. As can be seen in the chart below (figure C) levels of total income 
and contract income were fairly static over the period 2011 to 2013 with a slight fall in income 
overall in 2013. 
Fig C: Full, financial data set analysis of income 2011 to 2013 
 
Source: Author 
 
OLS regression results: full financial data set 
Improved ‘passthrough’ efficiency (positive correlations) 
Two of the independent variables have positive correlations with aEFF: CONT; and Ln(TA);  
therefore indicating their link to improved allocative efficiency. Refer to column two in table III 
for βetas relating to the aEFF model. 
Contract income  improved allocative efficiency 
The most substantial positive correlation we can see is that CONT (proportion of income 
derived from contracts) has a positive coefficient of 0.146 which is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This means that an increase of 10% in the proportion of income generated 
through contractual activities in a charity could increase their allocative efficiency by 1.5%. 
Whilst this might seem a small increase, the allocative efficiency (passthrough rate) is 
generally the key performance metric for charities, and charities will already be striving to 
keep this at its highest level. We can see from the descriptives for the model variables that 
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the mean value for allocative efficiency in the sector is 84%. Small, incremental increases 
in this metric are noteworthy.  
Total assets  improved allocative efficiency 
Again, in column two of table x we find the β for Ln(TA) representing the size of the asset 
base of a charity. This also shows a positive correlation with allocative efficiency, of 0.016, 
significant at the 1% level. This corresponds with the findings of Reddy et al. (2013), where 
Ln(TA) was also found to be positively correlated with allocative efficiency with a higher 
β of 0.196 significant at the 10% level. 
 
Reduced ‘passthrough’ efficiency (negative correlations) 
Four of the independent variables have negative correlations with aEFF: (GOV; ADV; VOL 
and Ln(TINC); therefore indicating their link to reduced allocative efficiency. Refer to 
column two in table III for βetas relating to the aEFF model. 
Governance expenditure  reduced allocative efficiency 
The highest negative correlation with allocative efficiency is shown to be GOV 
(proportion of total expenditure assigned to governance) with a value of -1.497, 
significant at the 1% level. Bruce & Chew (2011) suggest that charities may need to 
adopt private sector governance and management systems to remain economically 
viable and this variable was included to reflect a stronger focus on governance and 
maturity of established governance processes. The result indicates that for a 1% 
increase in the proportion of governance expenditure a corresponding 1.5% fall in 
allocative efficiency might be expected. The mean level of expenditure on governance 
is shown in the table of descriptives to be around 2% of operating expenditure. So, for 
example, if we were to increase the variable GOV by 1% we are essentially doubling 
the level of governance spend in the charity. Although this helps to provide context in 
terms of scale, the negative aspect of the correlation is unambiguous and statistically 
significant across this very large sample of 27,428 entries. This is an intriguing result 
and one that was not expected.  The hypothesis offered was that: ‘H4. Governance 
processes are positively correlated with the operational efficiency of charities’. It may 
be that higher governance costs, which include: ‘…internal and external audit, legal 
advice for trustees and costs associated with constitutional and statutory requirements 
e.g. the cost of trustee meetings and preparing statutory accounts’ (Charity Commission 
SORP, 2005) may also be linked to larger board size and so increased board member 
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expenses. This is something that may be explored further when the content analyses of 
the sample charities’ Annual Reports are added to the financial data. 
Advertising expenditure  reduced allocative efficiency 
In column two of table III we see the next most substantial negative correlation with 
allocative efficiency in the form of ADV (proportion of expenditure to facilitate 
voluntary income eg. Advertising and fundraising). This was included as a 
representative of the level of competition in the charity sector. The rationale being that 
increasing levels of advertising are required to fight for donations as the sector becomes 
more competitive. 
The β is negative and has a value of -0.981 which is significant at the 1% level. This 
would indicate that increases in competition within the sector have a negative effect on 
the allocative efficiency of charities and that an increased costs, incurred through extra 
advertising, directly effect the amount of money passing through to beneficiaries. The 
metric implies almost a one-for-one relationship where a 1% increase in ADV produces 
a 1% decline in aEFF. 
Voluntary staff  reduced allocative efficiency 
The third negative correlation we will consider is the one between allocative 
efficiency and VOL (proportion of total workforce comprised from volunteers).  The 
β is -0.047 and again, is significant at the 1% level. This finding does tally with the 
result from the Reddy et al. study (2013) although their result was not shown to be 
statistically significant and so not referred to for the purposes of this analysis. Here is 
another intriguing result and one that was not expected.  The hypothesis offered was 
that: ‘ H3. Volunteerism is positively correlated with allocative efficiency in 
charities’.   
Total income  reduced allocative efficiency 
The final variable, that has a negative correlation with allocative efficiency, is that of 
Ln(TINC) which represents the size of charity by means of its total income. The β is -
0.042 and is significant at the 1% level. This finding is also in line with the result from 
the Reddy et al. study (2013) although, again, their result was not found to be 
statistically significant and so not referred to for the purposes of this analysis.  
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Table II: Descriptive statistics of the full financial data set 
 
Notes: CONT is the proportion of total income derived from charitable contracts. LEV is the proportion of long term debt against total 
assets. VOL is the proportion of total workforce comprised of volunteers. GOV is the proportion of total expenditure assigned to 
governance. ADV is the proportion of expenditure used to generate voluntary income. Ln (TINC) is the natural log of the charity's total 
income. Ln (TA) is the natural log of the charity's total assets. Sector 101 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity is one of general 
purpose, otherwise '0'. Sector 102 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the education sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 103 is a 
dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the health sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 104 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity 
belongs to the disability sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 105 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the poverty relief sector, 
otherwise '0'. Sector 106 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the overseas aid sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 107 is a dummy 
variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the housing sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 108 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs 
to the religious sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 109 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the arts sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 
110 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the sport sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 111 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a 
charity belongs to the animal sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 112 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the environment sector, 
otherwise '0'. Sector 113 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the community sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 114 is a dummy 
variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the armed forces sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 115 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity 
belongs to the human rights sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 116 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the recreation sector, 
otherwise '0'. 
 
      
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Interquartile 
range 
            
Dependent      
tEFF 1.16 1.11 -0.31 68.90 0.99-1.27 
aEFF 0.84 0.90 -0.53 60.02 0.72-0.98 
      
Control      
CONT 0.50 0.56 0.00 1.02 0.00-0.94 
LEV 0.47 0.00 -0.10 1,589 0.00-0.04 
VOL 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00-0.25 
GOV 0.02 0.01 -1.63 1.00 0.00-0.02 
ADV 0.034 0.000 -0.19 1.66 0.00-0.02 
      
Size      
TINC  £   5,495,812   £     1,404,885   £0   £          951,392,000  £0.79bn-£3.6bn 
TA  £ 12,901,623   £     1,443,850   £0   £     15,041,152,752  £0.45bn-£5.74bn 
      
Sector      
101 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00  
102 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00  
103 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00  
104 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00  
105 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00  
106 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00  
107 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00  
108 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00  
109 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00  
110 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00  
111 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00  
112 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00  
113 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00  
114 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00  
115 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00  
116 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00  
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Table III: OLS regression results: full financial data set  
  aEFF Std.   tEFF Std.   
  β Error   β Error   
 
      
Constant 1.201*** 0.055  1.777*** 0.066  
(t-value) (21.93)   (26.76)   
CONT 0.146 *** 0.012  0.085*** 0.014  
 
(12.38)   (5.94)   
LEV -0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 
(-0.76)   (0.76)   
VOL -0.047*** 0.013  0.030* 0.016  
 
(-3.47)   (1.85)   
GOV -1.497*** 0.077  -1.245*** 0.093  
 
(-19.45)   (-13.34)   
ADV -0.981*** 0.043  -0.242*** 0.053  
 
(-22.56)   (-4.59)   
Ln(TINC) -0.042*** 0.005  -0.069*** 0.006  
 
(-9.21)   (-12.45)   
Ln(TA) 0.016*** 0.003  0.025*** 0.003  
 
(6.42)   (8.06)   
Sector dummies Yes   Yes   
F-value 61.96***   21.56***   
(p-value) (0.000)   (0.000)   
Adjusted R 
squared 0.049   0.017   
(R squared) (0.049)   (0.018)   
n 27423   27423   
              
Notes: CONT is the proportion of total income derived from charitable contracts. LEV is the proportion of long term debt 
against total assets. VOL is the proportion of total workforce comprised of volunteers. GOV is the proportion of total 
expenditure assigned to governance. ADV is the proportion of expenditure used to generate voluntary income. Ln (TINC) is 
the natural log of the charity's total income. Ln (TA) is the natural log of the charity's total assets. Sector 101 is a dummy 
variable equal to '1' if a charity is one of general purpose, otherwise '0'. Sector 102 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity 
belongs to the education sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 103 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the health 
sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 104 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the disability sector, otherwise '0'. 
Sector 105 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the poverty relief sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 106 is a 
dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the overseas aid sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 107 is a dummy variable equal 
to '1' if a charity belongs to the housing sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 108 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs 
to the religious sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 109 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the arts sector, otherwise 
'0'. Sector 110 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the sport sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 111 is a dummy 
variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the animal sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 112 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a 
charity belongs to the environment sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 113 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the 
community sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 114 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the armed forces sector, 
otherwise '0'. Sector 115 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the human rights sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 
116 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the recreation sector, otherwise '0'. 
*,**,*** significant at the 10,5 and 1 percent levels respectively 
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The comparative βetas for size, between assets and income, are found to be at odds in terms of 
their relationship with allocative efficiency in both studies (although not proved to be significant 
in the Reddy et al. study). This indicates that a larger annual revenue reduces allocative 
efficiency whilst a larger asset base increases it, albeit, in relatively small measures. 
The results for LEV are not shown to be significant and so do not figure in the revised model 
for allocative efficiency.  
 
Improved ‘commercial’ efficiency (negative correlations) 
Three of the independent variables have negative correlations with tEFF: (GOV; ADV; and 
Ln(TINC); therefore indicating their link to improved technical efficiency. Refer to column 
four in table III for βetas relating to the tEFF model. 
 
Governance expenditure  improved technical efficiency 
The leading independent variable exhibiting a negative βeta is GOV (proportion of total 
expenditure assigned to governance) with a value of -1.245, significant at the 1% level. 
As discussed earlier, Bruce & Chew (2011) suggest that charities may need to adopt 
private sector governance and management systems to remain economically viable due 
to marketisation forces within the sector. The β indicates that if the proportion of 
expenditure made against governance processes increases by 1% then technical 
efficiency increases by 1.2%. The mean level of expenditure on governance is shown in 
the table of descriptives to be around 2% of operating expenditure. So, for example, if 
we were to increase the variable GOV by 1% we are essentially doubling the level of 
governance spend in the charity. This would only produce a minor improvement in 
technical efficiency of 1.2% but the relationship is clear and also highly significant 
within the model. The link is here between the ‘commercial’ style performance metric 
(tEFF) and commercialised behaviours in the form of of stronger and established 
governance processes.  
Advertising expenditure  improved technical efficiency 
The next independent variable exhibiting a negative βeta is ADV (proportion of 
expenditure to facilitate voluntary income eg. Advertising and fundraising) with a β 
value of -0.242, again significant at the 1% level. As discussed before this was included 
as a representative of the level of competition in the charity sector. The rationale being 
that increasing levels of advertising are required to fight for donations as the sector 
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becomes more competitive. This result also highlights the link between an improved 
‘commercial’ style performance metric (tEFF) and commercialised behaviours in the 
form of higher levels of advertising in a competitive ‘market’.  
 
Total income  improved technical efficiency 
The third independent variable displaying a negative βeta is Ln(TINC) which represents 
the size of charity by means of its total income. The β is -0.069 and is significant at the 
1% level. This result shows that higher levels of income are associated with improved 
technical efficiency. 
Reduced ‘commercial’ efficiency (positive correlations) 
Three of the independent variables have positive correlations with tEFF: (CONT; Ln(TA) and 
VOL;  therefore indicating their link to reduced technical efficiency. Refer to column four in 
table III for βetas relating to the tEFF model. 
Contract income  reduced technical efficiency 
The first independent variable displaying a positive βeta is CONT (proportion of total 
expenditure assigned to governance) with a value of 0.085, significant at the 1% level. 
This means that an increase of 8.5% in the proportion of income generated through 
contractual obligations in a charity would reduce their ‘commercial’ style margins by 
0.1%. Although the amounts involved are low the relationship across the sector is 
established by the high significance level. This corresponds with the earlier findings 
regarding aEFF and its links to the passthrough ratio. It shows that charities are driven 
by contractual obligations to ensure the majority of income is ‘passing through’ to 
beneficiaries and that cost savings are not just contributing toward surplus funds. 
Total assets  reduced technical efficiency 
The second independent variable displaying a positive βeta is Ln(TA) representing the 
size of the asset base of a charity. This also shows a β of 0.025, significant at the 1% 
level. Again, this echoes the results of the aEFF model showing that charities with a 
larger asset base are more likely to favour higher ‘passthrough’ rates rather than 
generating excess surpluses. 
Volunteer staff  reduced technical efficiency 
The third independent variable displaying a positive βeta is VOL (proportion of total 
workforce comprised from volunteers).  The β is 0.030 and is significant at the 10% 
level. This result is less statistically significant but would point toward a high proportion 
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of volunteers resulting in a less ‘commercially’ efficient workforce, despite their 
obvious advantage in terms of salary savings. 
The results for LEV are not shown to be significant and so do not figure in the model for 
technical efficiency.  
 
Summary of findings with relation to hypotheses: full financial data set 
 
H1. Contract income is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of charities. 
A positive correlation with ‘passthrough ratio’ performance metric (aEFF) has been established. 
With an increase of 10% in the proportion of income generated through contractual activities in 
a charity could increase their allocative efficiency by 1.5%. This would evidence a focus of 
attention on organisational goals rather than ‘commercial ‘type behaviours of cost efficiencies 
and margins. It shows that charities are driven by contractual obligations to ensure the majority 
of income is ‘passing through’ to beneficiaries rather than cost savings just contributing toward 
surplus funds. 
 
H2. Debt is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of charities.  
Although the prior theorisation would indicate a connection between levels of debt, 
monitoring activities and improved performance, no evidence was found to in this study to 
substantiate the prior theorisation. 
 
H3. Volunteerism is positively correlated with allocative efficiency in charities. 
Hyndman & Jones (2011) warn that the major benefits volunteers bring to charities, such as 
focus, passion and legitimation, may not be adequately reflected in standard performance 
metrics and maybe this is reflected in the findings. 
However, high levels of volunteer staff may lead to reduced efficiency according to the results 
of both metrics, both aEFF and tEFF, and possibly reduced costs may be offset by reduced 
efficiencies and productivity. 
 
H4. Governance processes are positively correlated with the operational efficiency of 
charities. 
The link is here between the ‘commercial’ style performance metric (tEFF) and commercialised 
behaviours in the form of stronger governance processes. Using governance expenditure as a 
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proxy an increased focus on governance is shown to be correlated with commercial style 
technical efficiency. However, there is a negative effect on the traditional charitable 
‘passthrough’ ratio.  
 
H5. Competition within the charity sector is positively correlated with operational efficiency. 
The level of advertising a charity feels is necessary is used as an indicator of the strength of 
competition that it encounters in its area of operation. Advertising expenditure is positively 
associated with the ‘commercial’ style technical efficiency metric indicating that the 
competitive pressure these charities feel is leading them to behave commercially. However, 
increased competition, exhibited through strengthened advertising, had a substantial, negative 
effect on the ‘passthrough’ metric (aEFF) with an almost a one-for-one relationship where a 
1% increase in ADV produces a 1% decline in aEFF. 
 
How did the size of a charity affect the results? 
Larger charities with significant turnover are shown to exhibit commercial style behaviours that 
focus on cost efficiencies rather than traditional ‘passthrough’ approaches. 
In contrast, larger charities with significant asset bases are less concerned with creating margins 
and building reserves, and tend toward the traditional ‘passthrough’ model. 
 
Was there a sectorial influence? 
Sectors with a leaning toward a traditional ‘passthrough’ efficiency 
Sectors that showed significant correlations with aEFF were as follows: 
Health 103 (β = 0.033***), Overseas Aid 106 (β= 0.077***) and the Arts 109 (β= 
0.050***). 
Sectors with a leaning toward a ‘commercial’ efficiencies 
Sectors that showed significant correlations with tEFF were as follows: 
General 101 (β= -0.027**), Relief of poverty (β= -0.045***), Religious 108 (β= -
0.062***) and the Armed forces 114 (β= -0.162**) 
 
The largest significant βeta in any sector/ model was 0.077 and so sectorial influences 
accounted for a relatively minor part of the model. 
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Limitations of findings of financial data set 
The Reddy et al. study of charity commission data in New Zealand (2013) included independent 
variables based upon the number of board members and the gender diversity of those members. 
In order to supplement and enhance findings from the financial data in this study, the qualitative 
elements used by Reddy et al., when added, should help to explain the causative factors not 
identified by the financial model. Therefore, the addition of further, qualitative factors should 
strengthen the model.   
 
‘Top 500’ sample 
In order to supplement and enhance findings from the financial data, other elements were added 
to help explain the causative factors not identified by the financial model. These factors included 
the number of board members (BDS); the gender diversity of those members (GDIV); the 
presence of an audit committee (AC) and also that of an internal audit service (IA). The 
information was taken from the charities’ Annual Reports in the financial year ending 2013.  
Model specification 
Ordinary least squares regression is used to analyse panel data for the years 2011-2013 and 
measure the effect of the independent variables on charity performance.  
The following panel data model was estimated prior to the findings: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 =  𝛼  +    𝛽1  𝐵𝐷𝑆 +   𝛽2  𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑉 +   𝛽3  𝐴𝐶  +   𝛽4 𝐼𝐴 +    𝛽5  𝐶𝑂𝑁 
  +   𝛽6  𝑉𝑂𝐿  +    𝛽7  𝐺𝑂𝑉  +    𝛽8  𝐴𝐷𝑉 +    𝛽9  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸  +   ∑ 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑖   +    𝑒
𝑇
𝑖=1
 
 
Annual Reports for non-financial data 
The Reddy et al. study of charity commission data in New Zealand (2013) included independent 
variables based upon the number of board members and the gender diversity of those members. 
To complement the analysis further, information was also gathered on the presence of an audit 
committee and provision of an internal audit service within the sample charities. Variable 
identifiers for these elements are as follows: number of board members (BDS); gender diversity 
of those members (GDIV); audit committee (AC) and internal audit service (IA). In order to 
include these elements in this study a representative sample was taken and the information taken 
from the charities’ Annual Reports in the financial year ending 2013. 
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Additional Hypotheses 
H6. Large board size is negatively correlated with operational efficiency in 
charities. 
This hypothesis is based upon the findings of Reddy et al. (2013) where reduced 
performance (tEFF) was shown through statistical analysis to be significant at the 5% 
level with a βeta of 0.066. Whilst previous research had remained generally 
inconclusive about the relationship between board composition and performance there 
is a collection of works that argue that an inverse relationship exists between the two 
factors. Reddy et al. found statistical evidence, in their charity reasearch from 2013, 
that larger boards tend to reduce efficiency. They cite earlier findings by Eisenberg et 
al. (1998), Hossain et al. (2001) and their own earlier study from 2008 as suggesting 
links between larger boards and reduced financial performance. Taking an agency 
based perspective, Osterloh & Rota (2002) argue that in order to reduce the ability of 
some board members to take a ‘free ride’, whilst others take on all the monitoring work, 
a board should have less than six members. They should avoid the board becoming 
‘unwieldy’ and yet allow for a reasonable trustee workload. Wilding et al. (2006) also 
warn against boards that are too large, as this might lead to a dichotomy of members, 
with an ‘inner core’ of trustees dominating the others, with their will prevailing in the 
decision making process. 
 
H7. Gender diversity on the board is positively correlated with operational 
efficiency in charities. 
This hypothesis is also based upon the findings of Reddy et al. (2013) where improved 
performance (tEFF) was shown through statistical analysis to be significant at the 5% 
level with a βeta of  -0.113. 
Huse & Solberg (2006) argue that ‘bringing women onto corporate boards’ should have 
‘positive bottom line effects’. Their study concluded that the contribution women may 
make depends on ‘…the ability and willingness to make alliances with the most 
influential actors, to spend time on preparations, being present on the most influential 
decision making arenas, and to take leadership roles’.   
 
H8. Audit committee is positively correlated with operational efficiency in charities. 
The audit committee was originally established to consider risks and controls relating 
to the financial reporting process, but it has, over time, become a focal point for the 
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board’s wider review of internal control and risk management. Vermeer et al. (2006) 
found that organisations receiving government grants were more likely to have an audit 
committee and use financial experts to monitor outcomes. In a review from 2012, Jetty 
& Beattie consider the determinants of audit committees in the UK charity sector. A 
statistical analysis found that there were correlations between the size of the 
organisation, the number of trustees and a ‘Big4’ external audit. As you might 
anticipate, the larger the organisations were more likely to have an audit committee, as 
were those charities paying for a ‘Big4’ external audit service. The larger numbers of 
trustees on the board also correlated positively with the existence of an audit committee. 
All of these determinants were significant at the 5% level. This links in to previous 
work by Bradbury (1990) which argued that larger boards tend to create sub-
committees and delegate work to them; and the significance of the Big4 result is 
predicted by Carson (2002) and Vermeer et al. (2006). Other factors that were 
significant, but to a lesser extent (10% level), were those with a higher percentage of 
restricted funds, those with a two tier board structure and those in receipt of government 
grants.  
 
H9. Internal audit is positively correlated with operational efficiency in charities. 
The inclusion of this hypothesis was based on internal audit’s contribution to 
governance and the achievement of objectives. What every director should know about 
internal audit (IOD &IIA, 2013, 3) identifies the role as follows: ‘Internal audit is the 
eyes and ears of the board and its committees, above all its audit committee’. This 
phrase ‘eyes and ears’ suggest the closest of relationships between the board and 
internal audit, where you would expect a direct reporting line, with informal, as well as 
formal, contact. It would suggest that internal audit is a sub-set of the ‘Directorate’ 
function. The final part of the summary includes a role in governance review and 
reporting for internal audit: ‘…internal audit provides assurance to the board that …the 
organisation is being properly governed’ (What every director should know about 
internal audit, IOD &IIA, 2013, 3). This provides further legitimisation of the role that 
internal audit needs to undertake in the review and reporting of governance 
mechanisms. This would indicate that an internal audit service may strengthen 
governance processes to facilitate achievement of organisational objectives.  
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Representative sample 
Due to the much larger size of data set in this study, 27,423 charity years instead of 881 in the 
New Zealand study, the decision was taken to focus on the top 500 charities by income. A 
representative sample of 100 charities, 20% of the top 500, was taken. One hundred charity 
Annual Reports from financial years ending 2013 were selected using a systematic sampling 
technique (DePoy & Gitlin, 2011). The ‘systematic’ sampling was achieved by arriving at a 
sample interval width, based on the size of data set and the level of sampling required. In this 
case the data set consisted of 500 charities that provided the highest score in terms of annual 
income for the financial year ending 2013. This was a sub set of the original and full charity 
commission data set used in the quantitative modelling earlier.  
The sample required was 100, and the data sub-set 500, so the interval width was 100:500 or 
one in five. A random number between one and five was generated to provide the first 
participant in the sampling frame. After this, every fifth data entry was taken into the sample 
until one hundred had been selected. There were 4 reports that were unavailable on the Charity 
Commission website: one removed, one corrupted and two not filed. In these cases the next, 
subsequent entry was taken instead and all of these were available.   
 
Descriptive statistics of the ‘Top 500’ sample 
The charities in the sample covered a range in annual income from £17million to £781million 
with an average (mean) income of £55 million. The average (mean) board size was 13 members 
and, on average, 31% of the board was female. 69 out of 100 charities had an audit committee, 
49 of the 100 charities employed an internal audit service and the mean level of contract income 
within the group was 62%. Volunteers made up 22% (mean) of the total workforce. 
Expenditure on advertising and fundraising was 2.4% (mean) of total operating costs and 0.7% 
(mean) was also spent on governance. The assets of the charities ranged from £0.4m to £7.3bn 
with an average level of £145m (mean). Please refer to table x for a more complete analysis of 
the descriptive statistics for the variables.  
The ‘Top 500’ charities have increased their share of contract income within the sector in 2013 
(see below figure D): 
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Figure D: Sector share of contract income in the ‘Top 500’ charities 
 
Source: Author 
 
Sectorial influences within the ‘Top 500’ sample 
An examination of the sectorial influences has to allow for the fact that charities may be 
involved in more than one sector. We can see that 66% of the sample had some involvement 
in education (sector 102). We can also see that 31% of the sample was involved in poverty 
relief (sector 105) and 26% of the charities were active in the housing sector (107). These 
percentages combine to produce more than 100% and so the statistics need to be considered 
with this in mind. The following section will discuss the findings resulting from adding the 
qualitative data found in the annual reports to the regression model. Initial findings indicated 
that none of the sectorial influences were significant in the ‘Top 500’ sample apart from a 
marginal significance in one case out of the thirty two over the two models (aEFF and tEFF). 
The effect of the sectorial additions to the model was to weaken its overall significance as 16 
extra elements were being included that were not correlated to the independent variable. 
Hence, for the ‘Top 500’ sample sectorial controls were not included in the regression. 
 
Variability within the ‘Top 500’ sample data 
As we move to the more compact range of the top 500 charities by income we see levels of R2 
that reflect much reduced variability within the data. The R2 results for the two models 
(0.282:aEFF, 0.254:tEFF) indicate that the model now accounts for around 25% of changes in 
performance as indicated by aEFF and tEFF. This allows for a more ‘predictive’ application of 
the model where results are shown to be significant. Please refer to table x on the next page for 
R squared figures. 
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Pairwise correlation of the independent and control variables: ‘Top 500’ sample 
The independent and control variables were tested for the likelihood of multicollinearity, which 
if found would undermine the reliability of the model. The highest correlation was found 
between the independent variables relating to size: Ln (TA) and Ln(TINC). These had a 
positive correlation coefficient of 0.455 (significant at 1%) and is entirely to be expected, as 
with the full financial data set results. Those charities with a large asset base also will typically 
generate large amounts of income. This is also in keeping with findings of the study by Reddy 
et al. (2013) where the coefficient of correlation between these two variables was found to be 
0.528 (also significant at 1%). Also a correlation was found between sectors 105 and 106 with 
a coefficient of 0.469 (significant at 1%). This shows is that charities active in the relief of 
poverty are also often providing overseas aid. Other correlations range between 0.000 and 
0.388. None of the coefficients of correlation between independent variables are higher than 
0.455 and so the likelihood of multicollinearity is low. 
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Table IV: Descriptive statistics of the ‘Top 500’ sample data 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Interquartile range 
            
Dependent 
     
tEFF 1.13 1.11 0.00 2.55 1.03-1.21 
aEFF 0.83 0.88 0.00 1.60 0.73-0.98 
      
Control 
     
BDS 12.73 12.00 3.00 26.00 10.00-15.00 
GDIV 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.78 0.19-0.43 
AC 0.69 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00-1.00 
IA 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00-1.00 
CONT 0.62 0.83 0.00 1.00 0.17-0.96 
VOL 0.216 0.008 0.00 1.00 0.000-0.391 
GOV 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.050 0.003-0.008 
ADV 0.024 0.004 0.000 0.240 0.000-0.013 
      
Size 
     
TINC  £   54,843,353   £ 27,347,447   £ 16,633,000   £    781,289,000  £20.5m-£48.6m 
TA  £ 144,818,774   £ 24,892,841   £      398,000   £ 7,265,072,000  £10.0m-£57.6m 
      
Sector 
     
101 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
102 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00 
 
103 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
104 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
105 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
106 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
107 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
108 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
109 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
110 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
111 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
112 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
113 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
114 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
115 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
116 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
            
 
  
Notes: BDS is the number of board members. GDIV is the proportion of women on those boards. IA is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if a 
charity has an internal audit service, otherwise ‘0’. CONT is the proportion of total income derived from charitable contracts. LEV is the 
proportion of long term debt against total assets. VOL is the proportion of total workforce comprised of volunteers. GOV is the proportion of 
total expenditure assigned to governance. ADV is the proportion of expenditure used to generate voluntary income. Ln (TINC) is the natural 
log of the charity's total income. Ln (TA) is the natural log of the charity's total assets. Sector 101 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity 
is one of general purpose, otherwise '0'. Sector 102 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the education sector, otherwise '0'. 
Sector 103 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the health sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 104 is a dummy variable equal to '1' 
if a charity belongs to the disability sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 105 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the poverty relief 
sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 106 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the overseas aid sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 107 is a 
dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the housing sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 108 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity 
belongs to the religious sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 109 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the arts sector, otherwise '0'. 
Sector 110 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the sport sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 111 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if 
a charity belongs to the animal sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 112 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the environment sector, 
otherwise '0'. Sector 113 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the community sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 114 is a dummy 
variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the armed forces sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 115 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs 
to the human rights sector, otherwise '0'. Sector 116 is a dummy variable equal to '1' if a charity belongs to the recreation sector, otherwise '0'. 
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Table V: Regression results from the ‘Top 500’ sample data 
  aEFF Std.   tEFF Std.   
  β Error   β Error   
       
Constant 0.952 0.609 
 
2.737*** 0.673 
 
(t-value) (1.56) 
  
(4.07) 
  
BDS 0.005 0.006 
 
0.002 0.007 
 
 
(0.86) 
  
(0.33) 
  
GDIV 0.108 0.142 
 
0.064 0.157 
 
 
(0.73) 
  
(0.41) 
  
AC -0.062 0.062  0.044 0.068  
 (-0.11)   (0.64)   
IA 0.140** 0.056 
 
0.192*** 0.061 
 
 
(2.52) 
  
(3.13) 
  
CONT 0.256 *** 0.080 
 
0.133 0.089 
 
 
(3.18) 
  
(1.50) 
  
VOL 0.104 0.084 
 
-0.034 0.093 
 
 
(1.23) 
  
(-0.37) 
  
GOV -2.094 2.874 
 
-5.539* 3.173 
 
 
(-0.73) 
  
(-1.75) 
  
ADV -0.180 0.585 
 
0.303 0.646 
 
 
(-0.31) 
  
(0.47) 
  
Ln(TINC) -0.015 0.040 
 
-0.117* 0.045 
 
 
(-0.38) 
  
(-2.63) 
  
Ln(TA) -0.009 0.019 
 
0.013 0.021 
 
 
(-0.44) 
  
(0.60) 
  
Sector dummies No 
  
No 
  
F-value 3.50*** 
  
3.03*** 
  
(p-value) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) 
  
Adjusted R squared 0.202 
  
0.170 
  
(R squared) (0.282) 
  
(0.254) 
  
n 100 
  
100 
  
              
Notes: BDS represents board size and is the number of board members. GDIV is the proportion of women on those boards. AC is a dummy 
variable equal to ‘1’ if a charity has an audit committee, otherwise ‘0’. IA is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if a charity has an internal audit 
service, otherwise ‘0’. CONT is the proportion of total income derived from charitable contracts. LEV is the proportion of long term debt 
against total assets. VOL is the proportion of total workforce comprised of volunteers. GOV is the proportion of total expenditure assigned to 
governance. ADV is the proportion of expenditure used to generate voluntary income. Ln (TINC) is the natural log of the charity's total 
income. Ln (TA) is the natural log of the charity's total assets. 
*,**,*** significant at the 10,5 and 1 percent levels respectively 
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Summary of findings with relation to hypotheses: ‘Top 500’ sample 
 
H1. Contract income is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of charities. 
The link between contract income and allocative efficiency is continued again within the ‘Top 
500’ sample. This time the correlation is stronger with a 10% increase in the proportion of 
contract income delivering a 2.6% increase in performance. The most substantial positive 
correlation we can see is that CONT (proportion of income derived from contracts) has a 
positive coefficient of 0.256 which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This would 
evidence a focus of attention on organisational goals rather than ‘commercial ‘type behaviours 
of cost efficiencies and margins. It shows that charities are driven by contractual obligations to 
ensure the majority of income is ‘passing through’ to beneficiaries rather than cost savings just 
contributing toward surplus funds. The allocative efficiency (passthrough rate) is generally the 
key performance metric for charities, and charities will already be striving to keep this at its 
highest level. We can see from the descriptives for the model variables that the mean value for 
allocative efficiency in the sector is 83%. Small, incremental increases in this metric are 
noteworthy. Average proportions of contract income within the ‘Top 500’ sample were higher 
than in the full, financial data set as follows:  
 median of the ‘Top 500’ = 82%, and the median of the full, financial data set = 
56%; and 
 mean of the ‘Top 500’ = 62% and the mean of the full, financial data set = 50%. 
 
Over the three years the ‘Top500’ charities are showing an increasing reliance on contracts and 
have now exceeded the rest of the sector in the proportion of contract income that makes up 
their total income (see figure E below): 
 
Figure E: Dependence on contract income in the ‘Top 500’ charities 
 
Source: Author 
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H2. Debt is positively correlated with the operational efficiency of charities.  
This hypothesis was not included the ‘Top 500’ sample regression model as it was not shown 
to be significant, for either metric aEFF or tEFF, across the main body of the financial data. 
 
H3. Volunteerism is positively correlated with allocative efficiency in charities. 
No evidence was found to substantiate this hypothesis. Results were not significant within the 
aEFF or tEFF regression of the reduced sample size. 
There were no significant regression results for this hypothesis despite the full, financial data 
set showing a negative correlation between volunteer levels and both efficiency metrics. 
Average levels of volunteerism within the ‘Top 500’ sample were higher than in the full, 
financial data set as follows:  
 median of the ‘Top 500’ = 0.8%, and the median of the full, financial data set = 0%; 
and 
 mean of the ‘Top 500’ = 21.6% and the mean of the full, financial data set = 18%. 
H4. Governance processes are positively correlated with the operational efficiency of 
charities. 
There were no significant regression results for this hypothesis despite the full, financial data 
set showing a positive correlation between governance expenditure and the ‘commercial’ 
technical efficiency metric. Average levels of governance expenditure within the ‘Top 500’ 
sample were lower than in the full, financial data set as follows:  
 median of the ‘Top 500’ = 0.3%, and the median of the full, financial data set = 1%; 
and 
 mean of the ‘Top 500’ = 0.7% and the mean of the full, financial data set = 2%. 
 
H5. Competition within the charity sector is positively correlated with operational efficiency. 
The regression results for the ‘Top 500’ sample did not identify a correlation between 
advertising expenditure, used as a proxy for market competitiveness, and either metric of 
efficiency. Average levels of advertising expenditure within the ‘Top 500’ sample were lower 
than in the full, financial data set as follows:  
 median of the ‘Top 500’ = 0.4%, and the median of the full, financial data set = 0%; 
and 
 mean of the ‘Top 500’ = 2.4% and the mean of the full, financial data set = 3.4%. 
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H6. Large board size is negatively correlated with operational efficiency in charities. 
H7. Gender diversity on the board is positively correlated with operational efficiency in 
charities. 
No link was found between performance and board size, or the gender diversity of that board. 
Descriptives for these independent variables show that the average board size consisted of 13 
members and around a third of those members were women.  
 
Figure F: Efficiencies compared with board size 
 
 Source: Author 
Figure G: Efficiencies compared with gender diversity (GDIV) of the board 
 
Source: Author 
The figure below (fig H) shows the average proportions of women members of the board 
being at 31% (mean and median). 
 
Figure H: Frequency chart: gender diversity (GDIV) of the board 
 
Source: Author 
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H8. Audit committee is positively correlated with operational efficiency in charities. 
There were no significant regression results for this hypothesis. 69 out of the 100 charities had 
an audit committee, although many variations were found including ‘Audit and Risk’ 
Committee, ‘Audit, Finance and Legal’, ‘Audit and Finance’, Audit, Risk and Governance’, 
‘Finance, Audit and Risk’ and the ‘Audit and Control’ Committee. The variations in name will 
almost certainly reflect differences in Terms Of Reference (TOR) and subsequent authority 
and power. These variations may have contributed toward the lack of significant results for 
AC. 
  
H9. Internal audit is positively correlated with operational efficiency in charities. 
The link between an internal audit service and allocative efficiency is evidenced within the 
‘Top 500’ sample. The correlation is strong with the presence of an internal audit function 
associated with a 14% increase in performance. 
The β for IA, representing the presence of an internal audit service, shows a positive correlation 
with aEFF of 0.140, significant at the 5% level. This would indicate that the presence of an 
internal audit function (dummy variable = 1) may increase the allocative efficiency by 14%. 
For the tEFF model the key independent variable displaying a positive βeta is IA (presence of 
an internal audit service) with a value of 0.192, significant at the 1% level. This means that the 
presence of an internal audit function in a charity may reduce their ‘commercial’ style margins 
by 19%. This corresponds with the earlier findings regarding aEFF and its links to the 
passthrough ratio. It shows that charities with an internal audit function are striving to ensure 
the majority of income is ‘passing through’ to beneficiaries and that any cost savings are not 
just contributing toward surplus funds. IA may well be contributing toward greater efficiencies, 
as might be expected, but it is also ensuring that savings are utilised toward charitable purposes 
rather than just adding to surplus margins. This highlights a potential difference in the role of 
an internal audit function in a non-profit entity to that in a commercial one. 
 
How did the size of a charity affect the results? 
Total Assets (TA): results were not significant within the aEFF or tEFF regression of the 
reduced sample size. An independent variable displaying a negative βeta is Ln(TINC) which 
represents the size of charity by means of its total income. The β is -0.117 and is significant at 
the 10% level. This result shows that higher levels of income are associated with improved 
technical efficiency. The results suggest that larger charities with significant turnover are 
shown to exhibit commercial style behaviours that focus on cost efficiencies rather than 
44 
 
traditional ‘passthrough’ approaches. These findings echo those of the full, financial data set, 
where the βeta was at -0.069***, so we can see here that the effect is strengthened with a βeta 
of -0.117*. 
Note: *,**,*** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively 
 
Was there a sectorial influence? 
Initial findings indicated that none of the sectorial influences were significant in the ‘Top 500’ 
sample, apart from a marginal significance in one case out of the thirty two, over the two 
models (aEFF and tEFF). The effect of the sectorial additions to the model was to weaken its 
overall significance as 16 extra elements were being included that were not correlated to the 
independent variable. Hence, for the ‘Top 500’ sample sectorial controls were not included in 
the regression. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Results of the regression analysis of the full financial data set showed a correlation between 
the level of contract income and operational efficiency, as defined by the traditional 
‘passthrough’ metric, with a 1.5% increase in efficiency observed for a corresponding 10% 
increase in contract income (significant at 1%). This would suggest that charities driven by 
contractual obligations ensure the majority of income is ‘passing through’ to beneficiaries 
rather than cost savings contributing toward surplus funds. It would evidence a focus of 
attention on charitable goals rather than the ‘commercial’ behaviour of creating margins. 
 
Results from the ‘Top 500’ data set analysis echoed those of the full data set with a slightly 
stronger correlation between contract income and operational ‘passthrough’ efficiency: a 2.6% 
increase in operational efficiency was derived from a 10% increase in contract income 
(significant at 1%).   
 
Whilst these efficiency results might appear minor it is important to state that the mean level 
of operational ‘passthrough’ efficiency, across both sets of data, is relatively high at 83-84%. 
Therefore, small, incremental advances are most welcome to improve results for this 
fundamental charity metric. 
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A strong correlation was found between internal audit and ‘passthrough’ efficiency. A 14% 
improvement in ‘passthrough’ efficiency was associated with the presence of an internal audit 
function (significant at 5%). The regression results were equally strong for the ‘commercial 
style’ metric tEFF, only this time with a negative association of 19% (significant at 1%). This 
would appear to show that whilst internal audit may well contribute toward greater efficiencies 
and cost savings, as might be expected, it is also ensuring that savings are utilised toward 
charitable purposes rather than just adding to surplus margins.  
 
This raises an interesting question as to differences in the role of an internal audit function in 
a non-profit entity to that in a commercial one. Differences may lie in the nature of audit work 
undertaken between commercially driven and non-profit organisations and this area might 
provide an interesting topic for future research. However, both functions are contributing 
toward the achievement of organisational objectives, whether they be generating profits or 
delivering charitable services, and as such, convey a common and vital purpose. 
 
In conclusion, the argument that a considerable flow of public funds into the sector has resulted 
in charities altering their behaviour may be evidenced by the correlation between contract 
income and ‘passthrough’ efficiencies. Having to focus on priorities identified by the contract, 
and provide considerable amounts of performance data under contractual terms and conditions, 
appears to be increasing the focus on beneficiary outcomes. Results suggest that internal audit 
may play a significant role in assisting trustee boards to achieve this focus. 
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